This study examines the impact of capital controls using monthly information to construct higher-frequency, quarterly indexes for Malaysia and Thailand over the period 2000-2010 in a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model. The results show that effectiveness of a capital control policy is not identical between Malaysia and Thailand. This could result from country-specific factors, the form of capital controls as well as degree of efficacy, which vary greatly between these two countries. Restrictions in Thailand have no significant effect on inflows but are especially effective for outflows, particularly foreign direct investment. In Malaysia, capital relaxation tends to have a significant impact on inward foreign direct investment and portfolio inflows. However, the results show that changes in capital account policies do not have a significant impact on the real exchange rate in both Malaysia and Thailand.
Introduction
Policymakers in Asia have remained reluctant to do away completely with capital controls, despite pursuing an overall strategy of economic liberalization since the early 1990s. Unabated and large capital inflows tend to create asset bubbles in the non-tradables sector, which can suddenly stop or reverse, and cause financial turmoil given shallow and underdeveloped domestic capital markets in emerging countries. Many concerns relate to large capital inflows causing real domestic currency appreciation, rendering exports uncompetitive.
Correspondence Address: Juthathip Jongwanich, School of Management, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand. Email: jjongwanich@ait.ac.th Beginning in 2002, some countries in Asia had begun to re-employ capital control measures as foreign bank flows into Asia turned to net inflows from outflows, while both portfolio equity flows and carry trades accelerated and became more volatile and sensitive to developments in global equity markets. Global commodity and fuel prices also rose dramatically beginning in late 2006 until about the second quarter of 2008. Policymakers became concerned with both the adverse supply-side conditions and the renewed inflationary pressures. The recent return of large capital flows to countries in Asia, given Asia's strong recovery from the Global Financial Crisis and near-zero interest rates in the US and Europe, has induced some countries in the region to utilize various forms of capital controls once again.
Capital controls are seen as giving policymakers an extra degree of freedom to moderate the volume and composition of capital flows. They could increase the policy space for the use of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy to boost an economy without worsening the external balance, reducing the prospects of destabilizing capital outflows, especially during periods of political instability. 1 However, the macro contexts in which such controls have been imposed by countries have differed and the effects of capital controls are difficult to disentangle from those of other policies.
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of capital controls is mixed. In the 1990s, capital controls were only temporarily able to drive a wedge between foreign and domestic interest rates and to reduce pressures on the exchange rate in countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Ariyoshi et al., 2000) . Furthermore, these countries were unable to maintain interest rate differentials between foreign and domestic interest rates and reduce exchange rate pressures simultaneously. Nevertheless, Malaysia and Thailand experienced less significant appreciations compared with the other countries that used capital controls and were able reduce the amount of short-term inflows while lengthening maturities.
The apparent success of Malaysia in using capital controls during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 resurrected interest in their use in the post-crisis period when many countries in Asia experienced both large capital inflows and currency appreciation. In December 2006, Thailand imposed Chilean-style capital restrictions in the form of an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) of a withholding tax of 30% on the purchases of foreign currency exchanged for baht as the baht was appreciating in the face of strong capital inflows. In contrast with Malaysia's experience, the policy seems to have met with less success. There was an immediate and large decline in the stock market index when the policy was announced, the appreciation pressures on the baht seem to have continued unabated and by 2008, and the controls were lifted. Nevertheless, on 12 October 2010, in response once again to large capital inflows and appreciation pressures on the baht, Thailand announced a 15% withholding tax on capital When are Capital Controls Effective? 621 gains and interest payments on government and state-owned company bonds. Malaysia, in contrast to Thailand and its own practice in the late 1990s, has adopted capital account liberalization, both inflows and outflows, in 2000-2010. Therefore, the cases of Malaysia and Thailand seem to provide interesting but contrasting experiences with the use of capital controls after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
This study examines the effectiveness of capital controls on the volume and composition of capital flows in Malaysia and Thailand over the period 2000-2010 using a VAR model. 2 One of the key distinctions of our study is constructing de jure capital account restriction indexes as in Schindler (2009) but using high frequency information on a monthly basis, published by the central banks to construct quarterly indexes. Most previous studies use annual information from the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions published by the IMF to construct capital restriction indexes. Using highly aggregated information may fail to adequately capture changes in the frequency of usage or degree of restrictiveness changed within a year, and may thus give misleading results as to the effectiveness of such controls. In addition, this study examines not only the effects of restrictions on the volume of capital flows (aggregate, inflows, and outflows), but also on particular asset categories of capital flows (portfolio, direct, and other investment flows).
The study is divided into the following sections. Section 2 describes capital account policies in Malaysia and Thailand in the post-Asian financial crisis period. Section 3 discusses the methodology used to construct the capital control indexes in Malaysia and Thailand used in this study. Section 4 discusses the VAR model used to assess the effectiveness of capital control measures in Malaysia and Thailand while Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. Briefly, the results show that restrictions in Thailand have no significant effect on inflows but are especially effective for outflows, particularly of foreign direct investment. In Malaysia, capital restrictions tend to have a significant impact on inward foreign direct investment and portfolio inflows. Changes in capital account restrictions do not have a significant impact on the real exchange rate in both Malaysia and Thailand.
Capital Account Policies in Malaysia and Thailand
Malaysia and Thailand had contrasting capital account policies after the Asian financial crisis. Thailand introduced a number of capital restriction measures since 2003 to discourage net capital inflows and encourage net capital outflows. Malaysia, in contrast, introduced strict capital control measures during the Asian crisis, but has gradually lifted the restrictions since the early 2000s. 25   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 During the Asian Financial Crisis, the capital reversal in Malaysia was far less than in other crisis-affected Asian countries (Figure 1(a.1) ). This may have resulted from the negative sentiment generated by the imposition of graduated exit levies on 15 February 1999. Net capital inflows dropped noticeably in 2001, mainly because of the sharp decline in FDI as a result of the collapse of the dotcom bubble. Net capital outflows (asset side) started to gather momentum during the 1997 crisis period and continuously increased since then.
After the Asian financial crisis, the Malaysian central bank began to liberalize capital restrictions for all asset classes. Total net capital inflows improved in 2003-2004 as nonresidents invested in equities and bonds to speculate on the ringgit's appreciation. However, the ringgit appreciated only slightly and capital reversal was evident in all asset classes except FDI in 2005. Capital inflows started to rise again in 2006-2007 before declining sharply in 2008 in response to the current global financial crisis (Figure 1(a.1) ). Foong (2008) pointed out that during 2006-2007, there were some signs of speculative activity but the central bank did not impose any new capital restrictions to contain speculative capital inflows. The initial responses during that period included the sterilization of capital inflows, with Bank Negara accumulating large amounts of reserves while increasing domestic liquidity significantly by MYR 50.9B to MYR 298.6B in 2007 (Kuang, 2008, p. 333) . The prudential and regulatory framework was better aligned with international best practices because of fears of asset bubbles, particularly in equity and property prices and further strengthening of the domestic currency.
Restrictions on capital outflows were relaxed. Foreign exchange administration rules were liberalized so that individuals and corporations could invest more of their own funds abroad. Investing companies who had no domestic ringgit borrowing were freely allowed to invest their own funds abroad. Prudential limits were only prescribed on large investments abroad if domestic credit facilities were used. In April 2007, the limit on a bank's foreign currency net open position, equivalent to 20% of a bank's capital base, was abolished. This gave onshore banks greater flexibility to engage in the foreign currency business, allowing them to invest in all listed and unlisted shares and foreign equities. However, the limit for aggregate investments in shares and interest in shares was kept at 25% of a bank's capital base (Kuang, 2008, p. 338) .
The global financial crisis affected domestic investors in Malaysia only slightly and there was no sign of capital reversal in 2008 ( Figure 1(a.2) ). Most outward capital flows were in other investment flows and FDI while that in portfolio investment was negligible ( Figure 1 (a.2)). Foong (2008) argued that the key reason for the reluctance of domestic investors to invest abroad was possibly the lower returns abroad as well as a lack of requisite investment skills by domestic financial institutions, despite the Malaysian central bank's continuous liberalization of capital restrictions for domestic investors in all asset classes.
In Thailand, capital inflows started to gather momentum in 2003, reversing massive outflows experienced during the Asian Financial Crisis (Figure 1(b.1) ). This was interrupted by the global financial crisis, which led to a slowdown in cross-border capital inflows in 2008. Nevertheless, the rapid economic recovery in Thailand has encouraged the resumption of large capital inflows since the second quarter of 2009, approximating levels in 2007. Alongside the increase in capital inflows from 2003 to 2007, net capital outflows also increased substantially in Thailand, reaching $17 billion in 2007 ( Figure 1(b.2) ).
The Bank of Thailand (BOT) worried about the appreciation of the baht from the influx of short-term capital inflows. The nominal exchange rate (baht per US$) began to appreciate beginning in 2001 with the influx of short-term capital into debt securities (Figure 2(b) ). In 2003, the BOT announced a number of policy measures to relax restrictions on capital outflows, aiming to offer alternative investment opportunities abroad and promote Thai residents' investment in foreign countries. Nevertheless, there was a sudden increase in total outstanding nonresident baht accounts, from the normal level of B18 billion in -2002 to B63 billion in October 2003 . The BOT imposed capital restrictions for capital inflows and relaxed regulations for capital outflows originated by Thai residents.
The continuing appreciation of the baht led the BOT to impose additional measures to guard against possible economic instability in 2006. Nevertheless, the pressures did not abate, and in December 2006, Chilean-style capital restrictions were introduced. Financial institutions were asked to withhold from their customers 30% of foreign currencies purchased or exchanged against the baht as URR and deposit with the BOT. 3 The URR was eventually lifted in March 2008. Meanwhile, restrictions were imposed by the BOT to guard against speculative capital flows and a rapid appreciation of the baht. Other measures for relaxing capital outflows imposed since 2006 were also maintained in 2008-2010.
Capital Control Indexes
Capital control indexes are constructed for Malaysia and Thailand. 4 To capture changes in capital restrictions within a year, capital restriction indexes are constructed based on the information from notifications, press releases, and speeches related to foreign exchange and the capital account published formally by the central banks.
Measures are first divided into two categories, namely, those affecting net capital inflows (liabilities) and those affecting net capital outflows (assets). Within these two categories, the flows are further disaggregated into four types: foreign direct investment, equity securities, debt securities, and other investment flows (including foreign currency holdings and nonresident baht accounts). 5 The capital control indexes are constructed by assigning '+1' or '−1' to each announced measure. Any measure that relaxes inflows and facilitates outflows is assigned '+1', regardless of the source of the flows, whether residents or nonresidents. Any measure that restricts inflows as well as outflows is assigned '−1'. The number is scaled by different weights based on direct and indirect impact criteria. The weight is set between 0 and 2 -the higher the weight, the more severe the measure, especially from the policy-makers' point of view. For example, a measure designed to directly relax or block capital flows greater than $50 million is given a weight of '2'; if the flow is less than $5 million, the weight assigned is '0.5'. In addition, a weight of '0.25-0.5' is given when the central bank changes the regulation slightly, seeks the cooperation of or provides a particular option for investors, including financial institutions. The weight is increased to '1' when the central bank requests and/or requires investors or financial institutions to undertake certain measures. A weight of '2' is assigned when the central bank imposes a tax, unremunerated reserve requirement (URR), a two-tier market, or lifts certain policy measures.
Once the number ('+1' or '−1') and weight have been assigned to every measure, the numbers are sequentially accumulated over time to arrive at the indexes for each asset class. 6 The indexes are re-scaled to lie between 0 and 1 to be able to compare them with Schindler (2009) so that '1' represents capital restrictions and '0' represents capital liberalization. The capital restriction indexes are constructed based on monthly information and the simple average over 3 months is calculated to generate quarterly indexes.
Before the Asian Financial Crisis, capital restrictions for net capital inflows were eased substantially in Thailand, as shown by the decline in the index for total capital inflows (Figure 3(c) ). This was largely due to the liberalization in financial institutions, while liberalization in other asset categories remained relatively limited. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, however, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) reversed its policy. Capital restrictions were imposed on all asset types, except FDI, in 1997-1998, raising the indexes during the crisis period. Some of these restrictions remained in place until early 2000.
In Malaysia, capital control indexes rose during the Asian Financial Crisis (Figure 3 (a)). On 1 September 1998, Malaysian authorities imposed new regulations to prevent the outflow of short-term capital and speculation on the ringgit. However, the degree of capital restrictions for net capital inflows during this period tended to be higher than that in Thailand since, in February 1999, the Malaysian central bank imposed graduated exit levies to discourage foreign investors from bringing capital out of the country swiftly. Since then, the central bank has gradually liberalized the restrictions, e.g., the exit levy on profit repatriated after 1 year from the month the profits are realized was abolished and only portfolio profits repatriated within 1 year remained subject to the 10% levy. Capital control indexes for all asset classes, especially other investment (banking flows), have continuously declined as shown in Figure 3 
Assessing Effectiveness of Capital Restrictions
To assess the effectiveness of capital restrictions, a VAR model is applied using quarterly data for 2000-2010. 7 The data before and during the Asian financial crisis (1990-1996; 1997-1999) were excluded because of data limitations for Malaysia. For Thailand, the objectives of introducing policy measures during these two periods differ from those in -2010 . During 1990 -1996 , most measures were aimed at liberalizing capital and financial markets; during the crisis period, measures were targeted at stopping capital outflows; during 2000-2010, the measures were generally intended to control capital inflows.
Since the central banks introduced measures aimed not only at affecting capital inflows, but also at encouraging residents to invest overseas, the VAR model is applied separately to net capital inflows and net capital outflows. To clearly examine the effects of measures that restrict or relax capital flows, especially the switching effect, the model is applied not only to total capital flows, but also to the different assets classes, i.e., FDI, portfolio investment, and other investment flows (mainly bank flows). Note that in Thailand, for the liability side, since the central bank excluded equity security and FDI when imposing capital restrictions, net portfolio investment inflows were disaggregated into equity and debt securities to clearly examine the effectiveness of capital restrictions, especially the switching effect that may occur among debt, equity, and bank inflows. 8 All in all, there are five endogenous variables in the VAR model. Note that to be able to interpret the results easily, a positive sign is assigned to all asset types of capital outflows. A higher positive value implies a larger volume of capital outflows.
(2) Capital Restriction Indexes TIFC = index of capital restrictions on the liability side (net capital inflows). The index ranges from 0 (liberalization) to 1 (maximum restriction). TOFC = index of capital restrictions on the asset side (net capital outflows). The index ranges from 0 (relaxation) to 1 (maximum restriction).
(3) Real Exchange Rate REER = real effective exchange rate, constructed by the Bank of Thailand (1994 = 100). An increase in the REER reflects an appreciation. 9
(4) Real Interest Rate Differentials RINTEREST = real interest rate differentials between the Thai policy rate and the US 3-month Treasury bill rate, adjusted using consumer price index (CPI) inflation.
(5) Manufacturing Production Index 10 MPI = Manufacturing production index (2000 = 100). 9 The results when using the nominal exchange rate were similar to those using the REER but the diagnostic tests using the REER perform better. 10 Note that in a case of Thailand, the results when applying MPI or real GDP are not significantly different, but in the case of Malaysia, real GDP performs better, especially in terms of diagnostic tests. Thus, in Malaysia, real GDP (RGDP) is applied instead of MPI.
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Note that the VAR model also includes the real GDP of G3 countries as well as the share prices of industrialized countries as exogenous variables. Data on capital inflows and outflows are from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Interest rates, CPI, real GDP of G3 countries, and share prices are from the CEIC. The real effective exchange rate and manufacturing production index are from the BOT. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to test the stationarity of the data. 11 The selected lag length of the VAR model is based on the Akaike information criterion and sequential modified LR test statistic. The ordering of the variables is set by listing the policy variables last after the other key economic variables, i.e. capital flows; real exchange rate, manufacturing production index; policy rate and capital restriction index. For example,
According to the test, all variables are non-stationary so that we use first differences to perform VAR. Note that the direction of the control policies on capital flows between using first differences and level is not significantly different. However, the former has superior diagnostic tests.
RINTEREST t
The sensitivity of the model is tested by changing the order of the variables. Results show that the model is not significantly sensitive to the ordering of the variables. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of key variables to a one standard deviation increase in capital restriction indexes for Malaysia and Thailand. 12 The results show that the effectiveness of capital control policy is not identical between these two countries. The form of capital controls and degree of efficacy that vary greatly between these two countries could explain the xdifferent results of the control policy.
Results
The tightening (relaxation) of capital restrictions on the liabilities side in Malaysia, tends to have a significantly negative (positive) impact on inward FDI and portfolio investment inflows as reflected in the negative relationship between these flows (IFDI and IPORT) and capital control indexes (TIFC) (Figure 4(a) ). The effect peaks in the second quarter for both types of inflows but the effects tend to last longer for FDI, ten quarters compared with six quarters for portfolio investment. It is plausible that after the Asian financial crisis, financial institutions became cautious about the excessive use of bank-sourced inflows so that the responses of the flows to capital relaxation are relatively limited.
Meanwhile, there is no significant impact of changes in capital account policy on the real exchange rate. This could be a result of the exchange rate policy itself. Although the central bank moved toward a managed floating exchange rate regime On the assets side, the relaxation of capital outflows tends to encourage outward FDI in Malaysia as shown by the negative impulse response in Figure 4 (a) (i.e., note that the lower the index, the greater the degree of capital relaxation).
When are Capital Controls Effective? 633 In Thailand, on the liabilities side, the impulse response in Figure 4 (b) clearly shows an increase in total capital inflows, although it is statistically insignificant, after the imposition of capital restrictions. The impact peaks in the second quarter before dying down within six quarters. Composition switching tends to emerge from imposing such capital restrictions. The impulse response shows that equity inflows increase with the positive shock of capital restrictions, reach a peak in the second quarter, and gradually decline within five quarters. FDI inflows slightly increase but the impact is statistically insignificant. Because of the switching effect, appreciation of the exchange rate is evident, but statistically insignificant, in response to the imposition of certain types of capital inflows. Along with the appreciation of the real exchange rate, a negative relationship between capital restrictions and the manufacturing production index (MPI) is found in this study (Appendix 2). In general, the design of capital restrictions is crucial in meeting the goals of the central bank. In the case of Thailand, capital restrictions could, to some extent, limit the inflows of short-term capital. But the restrictions evidently do not help reduce appreciation pressure on the real exchange rate because of a switching effect. Hence, imposing capital restrictions should be done with caution since such restrictions could hurt the production side of the economy, as shown by the negative impact of the restrictions on the manufacturing production index.
On the assets side, a relaxation of overall capital restrictions helps to encourage Thai residents to invest overseas. This is reflected in the negative relationship of TOFC (i.e., the lower the index, the greater the degree of capital relaxation) with total capital outflows (Figure 4(b) ). The impact of a relaxation of restrictions on capital outflows is highest in the second quarter before dying down within a year. The relaxation of overall restrictions on capital outflows helps to encourage investors to invest overseas, mostly in the form of FDI, while the effects on portfolio and other investment outflows are statistically insignificant. The impulse responses also show that portfolio and other investment outflows have a slower response to the relaxation of restrictions than FDI, with the peak occurring in the third quarter for the former two flows compared with the second quarter for FDI. The standard deviations associated with the former outflows are also far wider than that associated with FDI. While cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become more important in total FDI outflows, 13 our results show that in addition to the relaxation of outward FDI policy, liberalization in other asset types, especially equity and debt securities, helps firms undertake outward FDI. This is because, in addition to cash, issuing common stocks or the exchange of stocks have recently become popular modes of payments for M&A transactions. Relaxing restrictions on outward FDI per se would have a smaller impact on encouraging FDI outflows.
The impulse response also shows that a relaxation of capital outflow restrictions (i.e., a decline in TOFC) gives rise to an appreciation of the real exchange rate (i.e., an increase in the REER index), although it is statistically insignificant. The slow responses of portfolio and other investment outflows could be one of the reasons for such an appreciation.
The MPI tends to respond negatively (positively) and significantly to the overall relaxation (tightening) of restrictions on capital outflows as shown in Appendix 2. This result is also found in the case of Malaysia. The negative relationship may arise from the fact that as investment (both quantity and quality) in these countries is still relatively low after the Asian financial crisis, encouraging capital outflows at this stage may only encourage the country to recycle savings without the necessary structural adjustments in economic fundamentals. Thus, the efficient use of savings (capital) to improve both the quantity and quality of investment in these countries is needed, in addition to a well-designed liberalization policy to encourage de facto capital outflows.
Conclusion
This study uses VAR estimation to examine the impact of higher-frequency indexes of capital controls in Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand had introduced a number of capital restriction measures since 2003 to discourage net capital inflows as well as encourage net capital outflows. In contrast, Malaysia, which introduced strict capital control measures during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, has gradually lifted the restrictions since the early 2000s.
We find that restrictions in Thailand have no significant effect on the volume of inflows, but are especially effective for outflows, particularly foreign direct investment. In Malaysia, capital restrictions tend to have a significant impact on the volume of inward foreign direct investment and portfolio inflows.
Capital controls have been used not only to reduce capital inflows or change the composition of capital flows, but also to achieve other goals such as to prevent the formation of asset bubbles, curb exchange rate appreciation, and allow more monetary policy independence. Results obtained in this study show that changes in capital account restrictions do not have a significant impact on the real exchange rate in both Malaysia and Thailand.
Our results imply that, unless carefully designed, the intent of policy makers using capital control measures to deter short-term disruptive inflows may not be successful. Even when they are effective, the effects are likely to be only temporary. The more effective and permanent way to shift the composition of foreign capital to less volatile longer-term inflows is to improve the investment climate and develop domestic financial markets, including local-currency bond markets. Appendix 1. Chronology of capital liberalization/restrictions in Malaysia and Thailand, 1990-2010 A.) Malaysia Date Events
1992
April Total borrowing by residents in foreign currency from domestic commercial and merchant banks to finance imports of goods and services was restricted to the equivalent of RM 1 million Assigned −1; Weight 0.25 July Borrowing under the export credit refinance facilities (both pre-and post-shipment) by non-resident controlled companies would be considered domestic borrowing Assigned −1; Weight 0.25 October Offshore guarantees obtained by residents to secure domestic borrowing, except offshore guarantees (whether dominated in ringgit or foreign currency) without recourse to Malaysian residents and obtained from the licensed offshore banks in Labuan to secure domestic borrowing, were deemed as foreign borrowing. In cases where an offshore guarantee is denominated in ringgit, it was subject to the condition that, in the event the guarantee is called on, the licensed offshore banks in Labuan must make payments in foreign currency (with some exceptions), not in ringgit. Assigned −1; Weight 0.25 November
The guidelines on foreign equity capital ownership were liberalized. Companies exporting at least 80% of their production were no longer subject to any equity requirement, whereas companies exporting between 50% and 79% of their production were permitted to hold 100% equity, provided that they have invested $50 million or more in fixed assets or completed projects with at least 50% local value added and that company's products do not compete with those produced by domestic firms. These guidelines were not to apply to sectors in which limits on foreign equity participation have been established. Assigned 1; Weight 1 December
Residents and the offshore companies in Labuan were prohibited from transacting with the currency of the FYR Yugoslavia without specific prior approval from the Controller of Foreign Exchange Assigned −1; Weight 0.25 1993 December Nonresident controlled companies involved in manufacturing and tourism-related activities were freely allowed to obtain domestic credit facilities to finance the acquisition and/or the development of immovable property required or their own business activities. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 1994
January
A ceiling was placed on the net external liability position of domestic banks (excluding trade-related and direct investment flows) Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 January
Residents were prohibited to sell the following Malaysian securities to non-residents; banker's acceptances; negotiable instruments of deposit; Bank Negara bills; treasury bills; government securities (including Islamic securities) with a remaining maturity of one year or less Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 February
Residents were prohibited to sell to nonresidents all forms of private debt securities (including commercial papers, but excluding securities convertible into ordinary shares) with a remaining maturity of one year or less. The restriction on the sale of Malaysian securities to nonresidents was extended to both the initial issue of the relevant security and the subsequent secondary market trade Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 February Prohibition of forward transactions (on bid side) and nontrade-related swaps by commercial banks with foreign customers to curtail the speculative activities of offshore agents seeking long positions in ringgit Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 August
Residents were permitted to sell to nonresidents any Malaysian securities Assigned 1; Weight 1.0 August Prohibition of forward transaction and non-traded swaps by commercial banks were lifted. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 December Residents may borrow in foreign currency up to a total of the equivalent of RM 5 million from nonresidents and from commercial and merchant banks in Malaysia Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 December Nonresidents-controlled companies were allowed to obtain credit facilities, including immovable property loans, up to RM 10 million without specific approval, provided that at least 60% of their total credit facilities from banking institutions were obtained from Malaysian-owned financial institutions. Nonresidents with valid work permits may obtain domestic borrowing to finance up to 60% of the purchase prices of residential property for their own accommodation. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 1995 January
A ceiling of the net external liability position of domestic banks was lifted. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 June Corporate residents with a domestic credit facility were allowed to remit funds up to the equivalent of RM 10 million for overseas investment purposes each calendar year.
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Assigned 1; Weight 1.0 1997 August
Controls were imposed on banks to limit outstanding noncommercial-related ringgit offer-side swap transactions (i.e. forward order/spot purchases of ringgit by foreign customers) to $2 million per foreign customer or its equivalent. Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 August
Hedging requirements of foreigners were imposed, except trade-related and genuine portfolio and foreign direct investment were excluded. Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 August
Residents are allowed to enter into non-commercial-related swap transaction up to a limit (no limits previously). Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 August A ban on short-selling of the listed securities on KLSE was introduced to limit speculative pressures on stock prices and exchange rates. Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 1998 September A requirement introduced to repatriate all ringgit held offshore (including ringgit deposits in overseas banks) by October 1, 1998 (BNM approval thereafter). Approval requirement was imposed to transfer funds between external accounts (freely allowed previously) and for the use of funds other than permitted purposes. All purchases and sales of ringgit facilities can only be transacted through authorized depository institutions. Assigned −1; Weight 0.25 September Licensed offshore bank were prohibited to trade in ringgit assets Assigned −1; Weight 0.25 September A limit was introduced on exports and imports of ringgit by resident and nonresident travelers. Residents were prohibited from obtaining ringgit credit facilities from nonresidents Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 September All imports and exports were required to be settled in foreign currency. Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 September Approval requirement for nonresidents to convert RM in external account into foreign currency, except for purchases of RM assets, conversion of profits, dividends, interest and other permitted purposes.
Assigned −1; Weight 0.5 September A 12-month waiting period for nonresidents to convert RM proceeds from the sale of Malaysian securities held in external accounts (excluding FDI, repatriation of interest, dividends, fees, commissions and rental income from portfolio investment). Residents were prohibited from granting ringgit credit facilities to non-resident corresponding banks and stock-brokering companies (subject to a limit previously). Trading in Malaysia shares on Singapore's CLOB OTC market became de facto prohibited as a result of strict enforcement of the existing law requiring Malaysian shares to be registered in KLSE prior to trade. Assigned −1; Weight 2.0 September A prior approval requirement beyond a certain limit for all residents to invest abroad in any form. Residents without domestic credit facilities are free to invest abroad in foreign currency, to be funded either from their own foreign currency or from conversion of ringgit funds. Individuals with domestic credit facilities may invest abroad any amount of their foreign currency funds or convert ringgit up to RM100,000 per annum for such purposes. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 April Corporations with domestic credit facilities are also free to use their foreign currency funds or convert ringgit up to RM10 million per annum for investment in foreign currency assets. These corporations must have a minimum shareholders' fund of RM100,000 and must be operating for at least 1 year. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 April
The threshold for investing abroad funds attributed to residents by a unit trust company is increased to 30%, from the current 10%, of the Net Asset Value of all resident funds managed by the unit trust company. There continues to be no restriction on investment abroad for funds attributed to non-resident clients. Fund managers may now invest abroad any amount of funds belonging to non-resident clients and resident clients that do not have any domestic credit facilities. They are also free to invest up to 30% of funds of resident clients with domestic credit facilities. Currently they may invest only 10% of resident funds, irrespective whether the resident clients have any domestic credit facilities.
• No ringgit account, physical withdrawal or transfer of ringgit at the overseas branches. All ringgit settlements must be made onshore; and • No public display of the ringgit exchange rate by the overseas branches. (ii) The arrangement will be made available only to non-resident investors with firm underlying commitment to purchase or sell ringgit assets. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 October
The registration requirement on investment in foreign currency assets exceeding RM50 million equivalent by a resident (individual or company on corporate group basis) without domestic ringgit borrowing is abolished. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 October Foreign currency borrowing by residents.
(a) The registration requirement on foreign currency borrowing in aggregate between RM50,000,001 and up to RM100 million equivalent by a resident company on corporate group basis from licensed onshore banks and non-residents is abolished. (b) The registration requirement on foreign currency borrowing exceeding RM50 million equivalent by an Approved Operational Headquarters from licensed onshore banks and non-residents to finance its own operation is abolished. (c) The registration requirement on foreign currency borrowing exceeding RM50 million equivalent by a resident company from another resident company within the same corporate group using proceeds from an Initial Public Offering on foreign stock exchanges is abolished. Prepayment or repayment of foreign currency borrowing by residents. The registration requirement on prepayment exceeding RM50 million equivalent on permitted foreign currency borrowing from a non-resident lender is abolished. Repayment of foreign currency borrowing with no fixed tenure or repayment schedule is deemed to be a prepayment, and therefore, registration requirement is also abolished. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5 October Investments of Islamic Funds in Foreign Currency Assets. (I) To further promote Malaysia as an Islamic Financial Centre and a centre for origination of Shariah-compliant investment instruments, the thresholds (50% of the net asset value (NAV) for unit trust companies and total funds attributable to residents with domestic ringgit borrowing for fund management companies) on investments of Islamic funds in foreign currency assets are abolished. (II) The investment in foreign currency assets by conventional funds managed by the unit trust and fund management companies continue to be subject to the existing thresholds of 50% of the NAV and the total funds attributable to resident clients with domestic ringgit borrowing. The registration requirement on forward foreign exchange contracts exceeding RM50 million equivalent per contract for permitted capital account transactions and anticipatory current account transactions is abolished. The registration requirement on ringgit-denominated loans exceeding RM50 million extended by a resident to a non-resident to finance or refinance the purchase or construction of residential and commercial properties in Malaysia is abolished. Assigned 1; Weight 0.5
